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ABSTRACT Government organizations design and offer subsidy to achieve objectives such as ensuring
positive environmental externalities, stimulating sustainable product consumption, improving social wel-
fare. Motivated by two such pragmatic subsidy policies, consumers subsidy and manufacturer subsidy,
we formulate parsimonious models under centralized and decentralized settings in a three-stage game
framework to obtain a fair understanding about the circumstances under which it is beneficial for the
government to subsidize consumers or manufacturer. The effect of two contract mechanisms, namely revenue
sharing and green-marketing effort sharing contracts are examined to explore characteristics of supply chain
decisions under subsidy. Our study reveals that the effectiveness subsidy program significantly depends on
the participating member’s intentions to further the cooperation. We find that consumers subsidy leads to an
exceptional outcomes, total profits of the supply chain is always less when supply chain members cooperate
with each other compared to decentralized setting. Profits for individual decreased considerably under
both contract mechanisms. Government also reduces per unit subsidy to consumers. However, subsidy to
manufacturer leads to higher profits when supply chain members cooperate. Amount of government subsidy
is also higher. Consumers also receive higher quality products. Furthermore, both the contract mechanisms
are able to generate Pareto-efficient scenario and higher social welfare of government.
INDEX TERMS Supply chain management, game theory, contract mechanisms, government subsidies,
green market, social welfare.
I. INTRODUCTION
The evidence of various government subsidies are common
in industry such as energy-efficient home appliances [1];
energy-efficient LED [2], electric or hybrid plug in vehi-
cles [3]. For instance, major car manufacturers such as
Renault, Nissan Tesla, Hyundai, Audi, Volkswagen are
engaged in developing electric vehicles (EVs) to reduce
reliance on fossil fuels, minimize air and noise pollution,
satisfy growing demand of environment conscious consumers
and others. However, innovations such as developing battery
electric vehicles (BEVs) or plug-in hybrid vehicles (PHEVs)
need expensive green components. Fortunately, many gov-
ernments offer subsidies for cultivating innovation and invest
heavily in developing charging infrastructure to stimulate the
use of EVs [4]. In 2015, Zhengzhou Yutong Group Company
Ltd., a leading EV manufacturer received subsidy up to 60%
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Nikhil Padhi .
unit cost from government of China [5]. Government also
promotes consumption of sustainable home appliances to
improve consumer welfare. For instance, it was reported by
the USA Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) [6] that
about $258 and $270 million in the year 2016 and 2017,
respectively were invested across the United States to stim-
ulate consumption of ENERGY STAR appliances includ-
ing clothes washers and dryers, dishwashers, dehumidifiers,
freezers, room air conditioners and cleaners, purifiers, etc.
Such initiatives are also common and well-practiced in coun-
try like Romania [7], China [8], India [9] and others. Besides
EVs or home appliances, government-funded energy efficient
lighting to cover cost of upgradation or subsidy to promote
consumption is also common. It helps considerable reduction
of energy-use and embeds significant savings in long term.
For instance, the Government of India provided grants up
to 75% through Ujwal DISCOM Assurance Yojana (UDAY)
to sell LED bulbs at a subsidized rate compared to market
price [10]. The government practice is also common in the
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European Union countries like, Ireland [11], France [12] and
others. The above evidences explain that government subsidy
policies are made in different ways and in different industry.
Despite the vast literature and mass media reports on sub-
sidy schemes and its outcomes to increase social welfare
(SW) and consumption, there has been little research atten-
tion paid to compare how government SW optimization goal
affect characteristics of supply chain (SC) decision under
influence of contract mechanisms. Researchers mainly focus
on how a subsidy policy can influence characteristic of pric-
ing and investment decision of SC members and purchasing
decision of consumers under decentralized settings [13]. It is
well documented that SC members can improve their indi-
vidual as well as overall SC profits through implementing
various contract mechanisms and get rid of double marginal-
ization effect. However, best of authors knowledge charac-
teristics of SC decision is not explored and compared if
the members try to cooperate through contract mechanisms.
We studied the effects of revenue sharing(RS) and green-
marketing cost sharing (ES) contracts. The main objective of
this study is to explore the following key questions:
1) Does the cooperation between two participating firms
affect government decision to set subsidy rates? If so,
what are the effects of cooperation through RS and ES
contracts on the green-marketing effort for the retailer,
greening levels (GL) of the product, and profits for SC
members?
2) How do system parameters affect two participating
member’s individual performance and the overall SC
performance under cooperation?
3) Which subsidy improves SW for government organiza-
tion and consumer surplus under cooperation?
In this study, we seek to answer the above questions by
formulating analytical models and analyzing their optimal
decisions under consumers subsidy (Policy C) and manu-
facturer subsidy (Policy M) policies. It is well documented
in literature that consumers subsidy have several advantages
such as sudden increase in consumption, economic growth
[14], as well as have adverse social and political effects also
[15]. According to Post [16], consumers subsidy programs
come to form ‘‘policy traps’’. On the other hand, subsidy to
manufacturer is also practiced to compensate higher invest-
ment cost of development sustainable technologies or product
quality improvement. To examine the strategic influence of
SC members on optimal subsidy rates, we investigate the
outcomes of both subsidy policies when themanufacturer and
retailer cooperate through RS and ES contracts. Our study
differs from the existing literature, the influence of retailer’s
green-marketing effort; pricing and the green awareness of
consumers are considered in demand function under three-
stage game structure. Consequences of two SC contracts are
examined to show how the cooperation between SC partic-
ipants influences the manufacturer’s investment decision in
producing greener product and the retailer’s green-marketing
effort decision, and most importantly how optimal subsidy
decision of government evolve. Perhaps, this is the first
study where it is reported that outcomes of subsidy policy
largely depend on the way SC members cooperate with each
other. In literature, researchers explained how RS contract
can improve profits of SC members in pragmatic scenarios.
However, our study reveals that both the RS and ES contracts
degrade the performance of each member in Policy C, but
it looks promising under Policy M. It is also found that SW
can increase if manufacturer participates with the retailer
by sharing green-marketing expenditure in the presence of
subsidy to manufacturer, not to consumers.
A. LITERATURE REVIEW
The precise question examined in this study related to the
literature on subsidies and coordination mechanisms is how
government initiatives can affect the equilibrium outcomes in
centralized and decentralized supply chain settings.
Collaboration between SC members becomes one of the
key pivotal for success. In this direction, RS contract has been
acknowledged as an effective means to arbitrarily allocate the
total supply chain profit among participants by preserving
interest of individuals and the overall SC [17]. In RS contract,
the retailer shares a percentage of revenue with the manufac-
turer for wholesale price negotiation. In pragmatic scenario,
Blockbuster Inc. [17], Apple [18] applies RS contract in
their SC. In literature, performance of the RS contract has
studied extensively from both academicians and practitioners
in various supply chain settings ([19]–[27]).
According to Taylor [28], marketing effort decision for
retailer is important because the retailer better understands
about local market conditions and can thereby stimulate sales
and profitability. In such a scenario, manufacturers share
a fraction of retailer’s sales effort expenditure, commonly
known as the participation rate. Higher participation works as
a stimulant for the retailers to promote products([29], [30]).
He et al. [31] reported that cooperative marketing activities
are common practice in the United States and joint expendi-
ture is about $50 billion in 2008. According to Xie and Wei
[32], the participation rates of the manufacturers is around
25%-75% in reality. In a recent survey by JØrgensen and
Zaccour [33] stated that manufacturer participation in retailer
sales-stimulating efforts increases overall performance of SC.
Zhao et al. [34] showed that the manufacturer can also receive
benefits from providing percentage reimbursement for the
retailer’s expenditure. Recently, some authors ([35], [36])
extended the concept of retailer’s sales effort to green sales-
effort where the retailer invests in green advertising. We refer
the articles ([37]–[40]) where the authors highlighted the
essence of retailer’s expenditure on demand expansion in
various supply chain settings. In this study, we make no
assumption about the specific type of expenditure, it refers
to the dollars invested by the retailer on demand-enhancing
activities of green product, such as pre-sales advice, after-
sales service, in-store advertising (shelf space, promotional
displays, well-trained sales persons), and local media adver-
tising etc., and we call it green-marketing effort.
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TABLE 1. Compression of existing models with the present study.
During past few decades, concerns related to environmen-
tal sustainability issues has been transformed from a trendy
issue to a realistic priority for consumers, industry and gov-
ernment organization. Thus, green subsidy scheme becomes
an emerging topic of interest for practitioners and academic
researchers [41]–[44].Massmedia reports also supported that
subsidy provided by national or local governments affects the
growth of almost every industry. Table 1 presents a summary
of recently published research on government subsidy and
highlights the contribution of the present study.
Table 1 demonstrates that most of existing studies con-
sider single subsidy policy, therefore, comparative overview
of influence of subsidies are missing on pricing, green-
marketing effort, and investment in green product devel-
opment under SW optimization goal for government
organization. It is always important to explore how optimal
decision alter and which subsidy improve profits for SC
members or product consumption. In addition, it is notewor-
thy to analyze whether the cooperation among SC members
pressurized government organizations to provide more sub-
sidy. However, existing literature fails to shade light on those
issues. This study contributes to our understanding on the
influence of cooperation between SC members on optimal
subsidy decision of government organization.
II. PREREQUISITES AND ASSUMPTIONS
We consider a two-echelon SC composed of a manufacturer
and a retailer, and examine interaction among the government
and SC members in a three-stage Stackelberg game frame-
work where the government determines optimal subsidy
rate. The manufacturer invests in producing green products
and sells those to consumers through a retailer. Meanwhile,
the government proposes subsidy policies for the manufac-
turer to compensate their growing R&D cost or directly
to consumers encouraging them to procure green products.
TABLE 2. Decision and auxiliary variables.
We formulate models to analyze single-period decision and
consider a full-information setting. To examine the optimal
pricing, green-marketing effort for the retailer and R&D
investment for the manufacturer under influence of gov-
ernment subsidy policies, we consider twelve scenarios,
namely Scenarios ij. Superscript i ∈ {c, d, rs, es} signifies
optimal decisions under different SC setting, namely cen-
tralized(c), decentralized (d), RS contract(rs), and ES con-
tract(es), respectively. Subscript j ∈ {b, c,m} refers to the
benchmark(b) model where either consumers or the manu-
facturer do not receive any subsidy, consumers receive sub-
sidy(c), and manufacture receives subsidy(m), respectively.
Table 2 represents list of notations used to differentiate deci-
sion auxiliary variables in different scenarios:
The following assumptions are made to establish proposed
models:
1) The market demand is linearly dependent on the retail
price, GL, and green-marketing effort; and its functional
form is Dij = a − bp
i
j + cθ
i
j + d
√
eij, where a, b,
c, and d are non-negative parameters, represent poten-
tial intrinsic demand, and price; GL, green-marketing
effort sensitivities, respectively. Therefore, higher value
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for a means the consumer has better perception about
the product. If c = 0, the demand function is similar
to the previous study by Desiraju and Moorthy [60].
If d = 0, the demand function become similar to the
studies where demand function becomes price-greening
level sensitive([61]–[64]).
2) The manufacturer bears cost for green innovation [61]
and investment cost is considered as λθ ij
2
and per unit
manufacturing cost (cm). Retailer bears cost for green-
marketing effort. In practice, retailers can stimulate
market demand through investment in local advertising,
in-store product demonstrations, improve personal sell-
ing strategies by recruiting skilled professionals, and so
forth ([28], [65]). Therefore, it is important to identify
the optimal green-marketing effort decision for the retailer
because of additional investment. The function of invest-
ment effort cost for the retailer is eij. For feasibility and
ensuring optimal solution, it is assumed that the green-
marketing effort sensitivity satisfies, d <
√
2 [60].
3) In consume subsidy, we call it Policy C, the government
provide subsidy δic, (0 < δ
i
c < p
i
c) on per unit product.
Therefore, the effective price paid by the consumer to
the retailer will be pic − δ
i
c ([52], [66]). In Policy M,
the manufacturer receives a fraction (ρim, 0 < ρ
i
m ≤ 1) of
the total R&D investment subsidy from the government
([67], [68]) to improve GL of the product.
4) Optimal decisions are derived in a three-stage game
framework in the presence of subsidy and the decision
sequence are defined as follows:
Step 1: The government decides subsidy rate
(δic or ρ
i
m) by maximizing SW;
Step 2:Themanufacturer decideswholesale price (wij)
and GL (θ ij );
Step 3: The retailer decides retail price (pij) and green-
marketing effort (eij).
However, in absence of subsidy, optimal decisions are
derived through last two steps.
5) Objectives for the government is to maximize SW. In this
study, SW function is considered as sum of profits for the
manufacturer and retailer, Consumer Surplus (CS), and
net government expenditures([49], [57], [69]). CS is com-
monly used as a measure to estimate product consumption
in the presence of subsidy([70], [71]).
III. THE MODELS
The scenario where government provides consumer subsidy
is discussed in Subsection A. Characteristics of optimal deci-
sions under R&D investment subsidy to the manufacturer
are examined in Subsection B. Finally, when the government
does not provide any subsidy is discussed in Subsection C as
benchmark.
A. OPTIMAL DECISIONS IN POLICY C
Due to direct subsidy to consumers, market demand in Policy
C isDic = a−b(p
i
c−δ
i
c)+cθ
i
c+d
√
eic, i = c, d . The evidences
are reported in the context of The US, where the Victorian
Energy Upgrades program is introduced where consumers
can enjoy rebate on purchasing LED lamp. In decentralized
SC setting, the manufacturer and retailer wants to optimize
their respective profits, and profit functions for the retailer,
manufacturer and SW for the government organization can
be described as follows:
πdrc = (p
d
c − w
d
c )D
d
c − e
d
c (1)
πdmc = (w
d
c − cm)D
d
c − λ(θ
d
c )
2 (2)
SW dc = π
d
rc + π
d
mc + CS
d
c − δ
d
cD
d
c (3)
However, in a centralized setting, the manufacturer and
retailer jointly determine price, green-marketing effort and
GL that optimizes total SC profits. In this scenario, whole-
sale price does not make any impact on optimal decision.
Therefore, profit function for centralized SC and SW for
government organization are obtained as follows:
5ccc = (p
c
c − cm)D
c
c − e
c
c − λ(θ
c
c )
2 (4)
SW cc = 5
c
cc + CS
c
c − δ
c
cD
c
c (5)
Optimal decisions for the decentralized and centralized
setting in Policy C are presented in Propositions 1 and 2,
respectively. For simplicity, we use additional notations and
those are presented in Appendix A. We refer to Appendix B
for the detailed derivation.
Proposition 1: Decentralized optimal decision in Policy C
is obtained as follows:
δdc =
AM3λ
b13
; wdc
aM2λ− bcm(2 bλ+ c2)
b13
;
pdc =
aM3λ− bcm(4 bλ+ c2)
b13
; θdc =
Ac
13
;
edc =
A2 d2λ2
13
2 ; π
d
mc =
A2λ12
13
2 ; π
d
rc =
A2 M2λ2
13
2 ;
5dcc =
A2λ(M2λ+12)
13
2 ; CS
d
c =
2 A2 bλ2
13
2 ;
TSdc =
2 A2 M3λ2
13
2 ; SW
d
c =
A2λ
13
; Qdc =
2 Abλ
13
.
Proposition 2: Centralized optimal decision in Policy C is
obtained as follows:
δcc =
2 Aλ
13
; pcc =
2 aλ− cm(c2 + d2λ)
13
; θcc =
Ac
13
;
ecc =
A2 d2λ2
13
2 ; 5
c
cc =
A2λ11
13
2 ; CS
c
c =
2 A2 bλ2
13
2 ;
TScc =
4 A2 bλ2
13
2 ; SW
c
c =
A2λ
13
; Qcc =
2 Abλ
13
.
One can found that optimal subsidy rate, GL, green-
marketing effort, SW, profits of each members in decentral-
ized setting or centralized supply chain profit increased with
consumers green product sensitivity and green-marketing
effort; and decreased with efficiency of the manufacturer’s in
R&D investment (See Appendix B). Consumers sensitivity
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with green product can improve overall supply chain perfor-
mance. By comparing optimal decisions obtained under cen-
tralized and decentralized scenarios in Policy C, the following
theorem is proposed:
Theorem 1: In Policy C
1) Per unit subsidy, and retail price, total SC profit, and TS
always higher in decentralized supply chain.
2) GL, green-marketing effort for the retailer, sales volume,
and SW remain identical in both centralized and decen-
tralized settings.
We refer Appendix D for the proof of Theorem 1. In the
context of SCM literature, the results are noteworthy. It is
expected that the total SC profit is always higher in central-
ized setting, but it is not true in Policy C. Moreover, GLs,
green-marketing efforts, and sales volumes remain uniform in
both centralized and decentralized settings. Consumers also
pay the same price, because (pcc − δ
c
c) − (p
d
c − δ
d
c ) = 0.
Therefore, cooperation of two members does not improve
performance of SC and fail to ensure higher amount of total
subsidy from the government. Although, per unit subsidy
is always higher in decentralized setting, but it does not
guarantee higher product consumption.
B. OPTIMAL DECISIONS IN POLICY M
In Policy M, government subsidy goes to the manufacturer.
As an example, in the USA, $2 billion worth of grants for
the manufacturers was provided to stimulate sustainability
initiatives and increase energy efficiency businesses envi-
ronment through the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act (ARRA)to produce advanced batteries and components
[72]. The market demand in Policy M is Dim = a − bp
i
m +
cθ im + d
√
eim, i = c, d . The profit functions for the retailer
and manufacturer in decentralized setting, and SW for the
government organization are obtained as follows:
πdrm = (p
d
m − w
d
m)D
d
m − e
d
m (6)
πdmm = (w
d
m − cm)D
d
m − (1− ρ
d
m)λ(θ
d
m)
2 (7)
SW dm = π
d
rm + π
d
mm + CS
d
m − ρ
d
mλ(θ
d
m)
2 (8)
Therefore, profit function for centralized setting and SW for
government organization are obtained as follows:
5ccm = (p
c
m − cm)D
c
m − e
c
m − (1− ρ
c
m)λ(θ
c
m)
2 (9)
SW cm = 5
c
cm + CS
c
m − ρ
c
mλ(θ
c
m)
2 (10)
Similar to Policy C, we derive optimal decisions in Policy
M, hence detail derivations are omitted. We present optimal
decisions in decentralized and centralized settings in Propo-
sitions 3 and 4, respectively.
Proposition 3: Decentralized optimal decision in Policy
M is obtained as follows:
ρdm =
M3
M4
; wdm =
4(a+ bcm)M22λ− 2 bc2 cmM4
2b14
;
pdm =
2 M2(aM3 + bcmM1)λ− bc2 cmM4
b14
; θdm =
AcM4
14
;
edm =
4 A2 d2M22λ2
14
2 ; π
d
mm =
2 A2 M2λ
14
;
πdrm =
4 A2M23λ2
14
2 ; 5
d
cm =
2 A2 M2λ(2M22λ+14)
14
2 ;
CSdm =
8 A2 bM22λ2
14
2 ; TS
d
m = ρ
d
mλ(θ
d
m)
2
=
A2 c2 M3 M4λ
14
2 ;
SW dm =
A2 M4λ
14
; Qdm =
4 AbM2λ
14
.
Proposition 4: Centralized optimal decision in Policy M
is obtained as follows:
ρcm =
2 b
M3
; pcm =
M2(2 a+ cmM1)λ− c2 cmM3
15
;
θcm =
AcM3
15
; ecm =
A2 d2M22λ2
15
2 ; 5
c
cm =
A2 M2λ
15
;
CScm =
2 A2 bM22λ2
15
2 ; TS
c
m = ρ
c
mλ(θ
c
m)
2
=
2 A2 bc2 M3λ
15
2 ;
SW cm =
A2 M3λ
15
; Qcm =
2 AbM2λ
15
.
Characteristics of optimal decisions in PolicyM are almost
similar with Policy C. Themain difference is that optimal sub-
sidy rate does not change with green-marketing effort or con-
sumer sensitivity. The expressions of optimal subsidy rates
in Propositions 3 and 4 also demonstrate that the market
potential does not make any impact on the subsidy rate.
Apart from that, one can find out that GL, green-marketing
effort, SW, profits of each members in decentralized set-
ting or total SC profit in centralized setting increased with
consumers green product sensitivity and green-marketing
effort; and decreased with efficiency of the manufacturer’s
R&D investment(See Appendix E). By comparing optimal
decisions obtained under centralized and decentralized SCs
in Policy M, the following proposition is proposed:
Theorem 2: In Policy M
1) per unit subsidy and retail price always higher in decen-
tralized SC.
2) GL, total SC profit, investment in green-marketing, sales
volume, SW and TS always higher in centralized supply
chain.
We refer Appendix F for the proof of Theorem 2. Unlike
in Policy C, the results are consistent. Overall performance of
SC increased in centralized setting and consumers also need
to pay less. It is noteworthy that under both policies govern-
ment reduces subsidy rate in centralized setting. By compar-
ing Theorems 1 and 2, one can find an indication that the
government subsidy rate might less if SC members cooperate
with each other. We would discuss this issue in Section IV.
C. OPTIMAL DECISIONS IN ABSENCE
OF GOVERNMENT SUBSIDY
We consider this scenario as benchmark to compare pros and
cons of subsidies. In this scenario, manufacturer or consumers
do not receive subsidy. Market demand function in absence
VOLUME 7, 2019 169811
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of subsidy is Dib = a − bp
i
b + cθ
i
b + d
√
eib i = c, d . The
profit functions for the retailer and manufacturer in decen-
tralized scenario, and corresponding centralized SC profits
are obtained as follows:
πdrb(p
d
b , e
d
b ) = (p
d
b − w
d
b )D
d
b − e
d
b (11)
πdmb(w
d
b , θ
d
b ) = (w
d
b − cm)D
d
b − λ(θ
d
b )
2 (12)
5ccb(p
c
b, θ
c
b , e
c
b) = (p
c
b − cm)D
c
b − λ(θ
c
b )
2 (13)
The following Propositions 5 and 6 represent decentral-
ized and centralized optimal decision, respectively. Note that,
optimal decision in the absence of subsidy is derived in
two-stage game setting and derivation is similar and hence
omitted.
Proposition 5: Decentralized optimal decision in absence
of government subsidy is obtained as follows:
wdb =
aM2 + bcm11
b12
; pdb=
aM3 + bcm13
b12
; θdb =
Ac
12
;
edb =
A2 d2λ2
12
2 ; π
d
mb =
A2λ
12
; πdrb =
A2 M2λ2
12
2 ;
5dcb =
A2λ(M2λ+12)
12
2 ; Q
d
b =
2 Abλ
12
.
Proposition 6: Centralized optimal decision in absence of
government subsidy is obtained as follows:
pcb =
2 aλ+ cm13
11
; θcb =
Ac
11
; ecb =
A2 d2λ2
11
2 ;
5ccb =
A2λ
11
; Qcb =
2 Abλ
11
.
By comparing optimal decisions, one can find that the
GL, investment in green-marketing, total SC profit, and sales
volume are higher and retail price is lower in centralized SC
compared to decentralized SC, because θcb−θ
d
b =
AcM2λ
1112
> 0,√
ecb −
√
edb =
AdM2λ2
1112
> 0, 5ccb − 5
d
cb =
A2M22λ3
1112
2 > 0,
Qcb − Q
d
b =
2 AbM2λ2
1112
> 0, and pcb − p
d
b = −
AM2λ13
b1112
< 0,
respectively. The result is consistent with the existing liter-
ature. One may verify that profits for the manufacturer and
retailer in decentralized setting and total profits in centralized
setting are higher in Policy C or M compared to benchmark
scenarios(see Appendix G) where SC members does not
receive any subsidy. The results make sense. Government
subsidy can boost profits for each SC members, the results
also demonstrate the fact. To verify, which subsidy policy
improve performance of overall SC in both centralized and
decentralized decision settings, we propose the following
theorem:
Theorem 3: Under both centralized and decentralized set-
tings, GL, investment in green-marketing, retail price, total
SC profit, SW, total amount of subsidy, and sales volume
always higher in Policy C compared to Policy M.
We refer Appendix H for the proof of Theorem 3. Theo-
rem 2 reveals positive impact of consumer subsidy on sales,
profits and SW. However, Theorem 1 demonstrates that inte-
gration of two members in Policy C always reduces the
overall SC profits. By comparing Theorems 1 and 2, one can
observe that TS is higher in Policy C under decentralized
setting, but it is reverse in Policy M. Outcomes are in the
spirit of Bagnoli and Watts [73], where the authors noted that
selling to environmental conscious consumers always affect
pricing decision of SC. In Section 4, we examine the effect of
two coordination mechanisms in detail to highlight behavior
of government subsidy if SC members cooperates.
IV. BEHAVIOR OF COLLABORATIVE DECISION
In this section, we analyze optimal decisions under two con-
tract mechanisms, RS and ES contract, in the perspective of
improving overall performance. In RS contract, the retailer
share a fraction of revenue (φrsj , 0 ≤ φ
rs
j < 1) with the
manufacturer for wholesale price negotiation. In ES contract,
the manufacturer shares a fraction (ψesj , 0 ≤ ψ
es
j < 1) of
retailer’s green-marketing expenditure to stimulate demand.
Demand functions in Policy C and M are
Dic = a− b(p
i
c − δ
i
c)+ cθ
i
c + d
√
eic
and
Dim = a− bp
i
m + cθ
i
m + d
√
eim
(i = rs, es), respectively. Under two mechanisms, profit
functions for the retailer and manufacturer, and SW for the
government are obtained as follows:
In Policy C:
π irc = [(1− φ
rs
c )p
i
c − w
i
c]D
i
c − (1− ψ
es
c )e
i
c
π imc = (w
i
c − cm + φ
rs
c p
i
c)D
i
c − ψ
es
c e
i
c − λθ
i
c
2
SW ic = π
i
rc + π
i
mc + CS
i
c − δ
i
cD
i
c
 (14)
In Policy M:
π irm = [(1− φ
rs
m )p
i
m − w
i
m]D
i
m − (1− ψ
es
m )e
i
m
π imm = (w
i
m − cm + φ
rs
mp
i
m)D
i
m − ψ
es
m e
i
m
− (1− ρim)λθ
i
m
2
SW im = π
i
rm + π
i
mm + CS
i
m − ρ
i
mλθ
i
m
2
 (15)
If one substitutes ψesj = 0 or φ
rs
j = 0 in (14)-(15), respec-
tively, then profit functions for the manufacturer, retailer, and
SW for government in RS or ES contract will be obtained.
Optimal decisions under two contract mechanism are pre-
sented in Table 3. The detail derivation of optimal decision
under the RS contract is presented in Appendix I and proof
of ES contract is omitted due to similarity.
The following theorem explores behavior of optimal deci-
sion in perspective of obtaining Pareto-optimal solution in
Policy C.
Theorem 4: In Policy C, profits for the manufacturer and
retailer decreased in both contract mechanisms with increas-
ing values of contract parameters.
We refer to Appendix J for the detail derivation. Similarly,
the following theorem is proposed for Policy M.
Theorem 5: Under Policy M
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TABLE 3. Optimal decisions in Scenarios CRS, CES, MRS and MES.
1) In RS contract,
a) π rsmm ≥ π
d
mm if φ
rs
m ∈
[
0,min
{
M1(4M22λ−c2 M1)
M2(4M12λ+c2 d2)
, 1
}]
b) π rsrm ≥ π
d
rm if φ
rs
m ∈
[
0, φrsm
∗
]
where φrsm
∗ is the positive root of the cubic equation,
α0φ
rs
m
3
− α1φ
rs
m
2
+ α2φ
rs
m − α3 = 0
2) In ES contract,
a) πesmm ≥ π
d
mm if ψ
es
m ∈
[
0, ψes∗m
]
,
where ψes∗m is the positive root of the cubic equation,
4 b(8 M2λ + c2)ψesm
3
− (c2(6 b + d2) + 4 M2(6 b +
M4)λ)ψesm
2
+ (256 b2λ − 2 d2(28 bλ + 2 M4λ +
11))ψesm −14 = 0
b) πesrm ≥ π
d
rm if ψ
es
m ∈
[
0, ψes∗∗m
]
,
where ψes∗∗m is the positive root of the equation,
α′0ψ
es
m
7
− α′1ψ
es
m
6
+ α′2ψ
es
m
5
− α′3ψ
es
m
4
+ α′4ψ
es
m
3
−
α′5ψ
es
m
2
+ α′6ψ
es
m − α
′
7 = 0
Note that after solving a polynomial equation of degree
seven, one can always find at least one real root. We refer
Appendix K for the detailed derivation. Theorem 4 demon-
strates that the cooperation throughRS or ES contract degrade
the profits of each member. It is not acceptable for the SC
members if the cooperation degrades performance of each
members, consequently, it is concluded that SC members
should not imply RS or ES contracts in presence of Policy C.
Theorem 5 reveals that cooperation between members can
improve profits for each member in Policy M. The graphical
representations of profits for the retailer, manufacturer under
decentralized settings, RS and ES contracts in Policies C are
presented in Fig. 1. The following parameter values are used
for numerical verification : a = 300, b = 0.5, c = 0.4,
d = 0.1, cm = $50, λ = 1.
The above figures justify Theorem 4. Profits for retailer
and manufacturer in Policy C decreases with the increas-
ing values of contract parameters as shown in Fig. 1a-1b.
FIGURE 1. Profits for the SC members in Policy C.
Similarly, graphical representations of profits for the retailer,
manufacturer under decentralized settings, RS and ES con-
tracts in Policy M are presented in Fig. 2.
Therefore, both SC members can receive higher profits
in Policy M by implementing RS or ES contracts as shown
in Fig. 2. By solving cubic equation for RS contract in Policy
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FIGURE 2. Profits for the supply chain members in Policy M.
M and comparing limits, one can find that RS contract leads
to win-win outcomes if φrsm ∈ (0, 0.2219). Similarly, ES
contract leads to win-win outcomes if ψ rsm ∈ (0, 0.0553).
Therefore, the analysis provides following two insights, first,
SC members can receive higher profits through cooperation
in Policy M, but not in Policy C. Second, the optimal rate of
subsidy reduced if SC members cooperate. Next we discuss
the nature of optimal decision under RS and ES contracts in
absence of subsidy.
Proposition 7: Optimal decision in RS contract in absence
of subsidy is as follows:
wrsb =
(AM2λ(1− φrsb )+ bcm1
rs
b )(1− φ
rs
b )
b1rsb
; θ rsb =
Ac
1rsb
;
prsb =
A(M3 −M2φrsb )λ+ bcm1
rs
b
b1rsb
;
ersb =
A2 d2λ2(1− φrsb )
2
1rsb
2 ; π
rs
mb =
A2λ
1rsb
;
π rsrb =
A2(M2 + d2φrsb )λ
2(1− φrsb )
1rsb
2 ;
5rscb =
A2((M2 + d2φrsb )λ+1
rs
b )λ
1rsb
2 : Q
rs
b =
2 Abλ
1rsb
.
Proposition 8: Optimal decision in ES contract in absence
of subsidy is as follows:
wesb =
Aλ(M2(1− ψesb )
2
+ d2ψesb
2)+ bcm1esb
b1esb
;
θesb =
Ac(1− ψesb )
2
1esb
;
pesb =
Aλ(M3(1− ψesb )
2
+ d2ψesb
2)+ bcm1esb
1esb
;
eesb =
A2 d2λ2(1− ψesb )
2
1esb
2 ; π
es
mb =
A2λ(1− ψesb )
2
1esb
;
πesrb =
A2(M2 − 4 bψesb )λ
2(1− ψesb )
3
1esb
2 ;
5escb =
A2λ((M2 − 4 bψesb )λ(1− ψ
es
b )+1
es
b )(1− ψ
es
b )
2
1esb
2 ;
Qesb =
2 bAλ(1− ψesb )
2
1esb
.
Based on the results in above two propositions, we propose
the following theorem to illustrate the influences of RS and
ES contracts in the absence of subsidy.
Theorem 6: 1) In RS contract,
a) π rsmb ≥ π
d
mb if φ
rs
b > 0
b) π rsrb ≥ π
d
rb if
φrsb ∈
[
0,min
{
2 c2 M112
16 b2λ11+c2(4M12λ+c2 d2)
, 1
}]
2) In ES contract,
a) πesmb ≥ π
d
mb if ψ
es
b ∈ [0, 1/2]
b) πesrb ≥ π
d
rb if ψ
es
b ∈
[
0, ψes∗b
]
,
where ψes∗b is the real root of the equation, α
′′
0ψ
es
b
3
−
α′′0ψ
es
b
2
+ α′′0ψ
es
b − c
212 = 0
See Appendix L for the detail of Theorem 6. The graphical
representations of profits for the manufacturer and retailer in
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FIGURE 3. Profits for the supply chain members in absence of subsidy.
RS and ES contracts in the absence of subsidy are presented
in Fig. 3. The parameter values remain unchanged.
Theorem 6 also supports the findings of existing literature,
each member can receive higher profits compared to decen-
tralized setting if they collaborate with each others, in this
FIGURE 4. Comparisons of the optimal retail prices, GLs, and
green-marketing efforts for the retailer in Policy M and benchmark
scenario.
way overall profits is also improved. Graphical representa-
tions of profit function as shown in Fig. 3a-3d also support
the claim. One can find that RS contract leads to win-win
outcomes if φrsb ∈ (0, 0.1522). Similarly, ES contract leads
to win-win outcomes if ψ rsb ∈ (0, 0.0386). Note that, how to
design contract so that each SC member can receive higher
profits compared to decentralized setting and total profits
would be equal to centralized profits is not the main objec-
tive of this study. One can employ several hybrid contract
mechanisms, for example, revenue-and-green-marketing cost
sharing (RSES) contract(see Appendix M) in this regards for
SC coordination.
V. MANAGERIAL INSIGHTS AND DISCUSSION
This study explores the characteristics of optimal decisions
in two contract mechanisms under two government subsidy
policies. Results obtained in presence of consumers subsidy
contradict the common believe that optimal decision under
centralized setting or under RS or ES contract mechanisms
outperforms decision under decentralized decision. However,
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FIGURE 5. The optimal subsidy rates and TSs in Policy C and Policy M,
and SWs in Policy M.
performances of SC members improve under manufacturer
subsidy. The optimal retail prices, GLs, and green-marketing
efforts for the retailer in Policy M and benchmark scenario
are shown in Fig. 4.
From Fig. 4, one can observe that GLs of the product
improves under contract mechanisms. Moreover, consumers
can receive green products at less prices with higher GL if SC
members implement contract mechanisms. The retailer can
also invest more in green-marketing effort under cooperation
due to higher demand. Consequently, cooperation between
SC members improve performance under Policy M. The
optimal subsidy rates and TSs in Policy C and Policy M; and
SWs in Policy M are shown in Fig. 5.
Figures 5a-5b demonstrate that optimal subsidy rates and
TSs always higher in decentralized setting compared to other
four scenarios in Policy C. TSs are decreased under RS
and ES contracts. If per-unit subsidy decreases, consumers
demand also decreases. However, the nature of optimal sub-
sidy rates is remain similar in PolicyM, but TSs are increased.
Therefore, government organizations adjusted subsidy rate
and total amount of subsidy according to cooperation. In pol-
icy M, one can observe that cooperation does not degrade the
performance. There are numerous issues such as high cost
of environmental technologies associated with new product
manufacturing or product up-gradation, lack of perception in
implementing complex environmental management system,
legislation restriction, hiring specialized labour, highly price
sensitive consumers etc. [74] that a manufacturer can experi-
ence in a pragmatic scenario to integrate sustainability mea-
sures. In this regards, researchers highlighted the influence
of contract mechanism and government subsidies. However,
present study reveals that SC performance may worse off
if members imply contract mechanism in presence of con-
sumer subsidy. In contrast, overall performance, SWs, GLs
are increased if SC members coordinates and government
provides subsidy to manufacturer.
VI. CONCLUSION
Issues related with government subsidy to encourage green
product manufacturing and consumption have received con-
siderable attention from both academics and practitioners.
However, the influence of cooperation between SC members
in presence of subsidy is not as clear. It is noteworthy to
analyze whether the cooperation forces government orga-
nizations to redefine subsidy rates. This study investigates
the interaction between two SC members in price-GL and
green-marketing effort sensitive demand under SW optimiza-
tion goal of government organizations. Optimal decisions are
derived for twelve scenarios, and results are compared to
explore effectiveness of consumer and manufacturer subsidy
in presence of RS and ES contracts. The following outcomes
are of managerial significance.
It is found that the effectiveness of cooperation between
two members are highly correlated with subsidy policies.
Contract mechanisms such as RS and ES contracts fail to
improve performance in presence of consumers subsidy.
Jia et al. [75] found that the absence of government support
is one of the key obstructions in countries like Brazil, India,
Malaysia for green SC practice. In this direction, perhaps this
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is the first articles, where it is found that the cooperation
through RS or ES contracts in presence of consumer subsidy
can produce sub-optimal outcomes. Therefore, cooperative
motive of SC members is pivotal for successful implemen-
tation of consumer subsidy. Due to higher demand under
cooperation, government reduces per-unit subsidy, which can
discourage consumers also. However, characteristics of opti-
mal decision is totally different in Policy M. In that policy,
consumers receive product at less price with higher GL. SW
maximization goal for government is also improved and each
SC member receives higher profits. Although, the optimal
government subsidy rates decreased if SC members cooper-
ate, till amount of government subsidy is higher compered
to decentralized scenario. Apart from short-term benefits,
the technology innovation or product development through
subsidy to manufacturers can help to ensure future sustain-
ability. Overall, an appropriate mix of supply chain coordi-
nation mechanisms and subsidy policy is crucial to achieve
sustainability goal.
The main focus of this study is to explore the behavior of
contract mechanisms under two subsidy policies. Therefore,
one of the immediate extension of this study is to design
contract mechanisms in presence of government SW opti-
mization goal. In practice, direct selling channel for the man-
ufacturer or closed-loop supply chain for re-manufacturing
is common, therefore, it will be interesting to explore char-
acteristics of optimal decision under those settings. One can
analyze other subsidy schemes where both the consumer
and manufacture or retailer and manufacturer jointly receive
subsidy.
APPENDIX A
LIST OF NOTATIONS
A = a− bcm; M1 = 2 b− d2; M2 = 4 b− d2;
M3 = 6 b− d2;M4 = 14b− 3d2; M5 = bcm1esc ;
M6 = M2 −M1φrsm
ϒ1 = 2(b+ (M2 + d2φrsc )(1− φ
rs
c ))λ+1
rs
c
ϒ2 = 12(1− ψesc )
2
− d2λψesc (1− 2ψ
es
c )
ϒ3 = 2(5 b(1− ψesc )− d
2)λ(1− ψesc )+1
es
c
61 = (M2 − d2φrsm )(2λM6(M2 + d
2φrsm )(1− φ
rs
m )+1
rs
m)
62 = (M3 − 2M1φrsm − d
2φrsm
2)(M4 − 4 M1φrsm − d
2φrsm
2)
63 = 2(4 b(1− ψesm )
2
− d2)2 + 7 d2 M2ψesm (7− 6ψ
es
m )
+ 4 bd2ψesm
2(7ψesm − 8)
64 = 3(4 b(1−ψesm )
2
− d2)2 + 2 bd2(1− ψesm )
2(2+ 17ψesm )
− d4(1+ ψesm (7− 6ψ
es
m ))
65 = 2 M2 − (2 b+M4)ψesm + 8bψ
es
m
2
66 = 96 b2λ(1− ψesm )
4
− d2(d2λ(2− 3ψ)
+ c2(1− ψesm )
2)(3− 4ψ)− 2 b(2 d2λ(12− 17ψesm )
+ 7 c2(1− ψesm )
2)(1− ψesm )
2
67 = 14 b(1− ψesm )
2
− d2(3− 4ψesm )
11 = M2λ− c2
12 = M2λ+11
13 = M1λ− c2
14 = 4M22λ− c2 M4
15 = M22λ− c2 M3
1rsc = 13 + d
2φrsc
2
1esc = 13(1− ψ
es
c )
2
+ d2λψesc
2
1rsm = 14 − 4 M112φ
rs
m + (4 M1
2λ+ c2 d2)φrsm
2
1esm = 14(1− 2ψ
es
m )
4
− 2 d212ψesm (1− ψ
es
m )
2
+ d2(c2
+ d2λ− 16 bλψesm − (16 bλ− c
2
+ 212)ψesm
2)ψesm
2
1rsb = 12 − 2 M1λφ
rs
b
1esb = 12(1− ψ
es
b )
2
− d2λψesm (1− 2ψ
es
b )
APPENDIX B
OPTIMAL DECISION IN DECENTRALIZED AND
CENTRALIZED SUPPLY CHAIN IN POLICY C
The optimal solution of the retailer’s optimization problem
defined in (1) is obtained by solving
∂πdrc
∂pdc
= a− b(2 pdc − w
d
c − δ
d
c )+ cθ
d
c + d
√
edc = 0
and
∂πdrc
∂edc
=
d(pdc − w
d
c )− 2
√
edc
2
√
edc
= 0
After simplification, retail price and green-investment effort
are obtained as pdc =
2 a+2 b(w+δdc )+c
2θdc −d
2 wdc
M2
and edc =
d2(a−b(wdc−δ
d
c )+cθ
d
c )
2
M22
. Profit function for the retailer is concave
because ∂
2πdrc
∂pdc
2 = −2 b < 0 and
∂2πdrc
∂pdc
2 ×
∂2πdrc
∂edc
2 −
(
∂2πdrc
∂pdc ∂edc
)2
=
M32
4 d2(a− b(wdc − δdc )+ cθdc )2
> 0
Substituting optimal responses for the retailer, profit function
for the manufacturer is obtained as
πdmc =
2 b(wdc − cm)(a− b(w
d
c − δ
d
c )+ cθ
d
c )
M2
− λθdc
2
Solving first-order conditions, ∂π
d
mc
∂wdc
=
2 b(a+b(cm−2 wdc+δ
d
c )+cθ
d
c )
M2
= 0 and ∂π
d
mc
∂θdc
=
2 bc(wdc−cm)
M2
− 2λθdc = 0, simultane-
ously, the wholesale price and GL are obtained as wdc =
(a+b(cm+δdc ))M2λ−bc
2 cm
b12
and θdc =
c(A+bδdc ))
12
. Profit function for
the manufacturer is also concave because ∂
2πdmc
∂wdc
2 = −
4 b2
M2
< 0
and
∂2πdmc
∂wdc
2 ×
∂2πdmc
∂θdc
2 −
(
∂2πdmc
∂wdc ∂θdc
)2
=
M2122
4 d2(A− bδdc ))2λ2
> 0
respectively.
VOLUME 7, 2019 169817
S. Saha et al.: Is It a Strategic Move to Subsidized Consumers Instead of the Manufacturer?
Substituting, optimal responses in (3), SW dc is obtained as
follows:
SW dc
=
(a+b(cm−δdc ))λ((a−b(cm+δ
d
c )c
2)+(AM3−bM1δdc )λ)
12
2
Therefore, optimal value of δdc is obtained by solving
dSW dc
dδdc
= 0. On simplification, optimal subsidy rate is
obtained as δdc =
AM3λ
b12
. SW dc is concave because
d2 SW dc
dδdc
2 =
−
2 b2λ13
12
2 < 0.
Similarly optimal decision for centralized supply chain is
obtained by solving
∂5ccc
∂pcc
= a− b(2 pcc − cm − δ
c
c)+ cθ
c
c + d
√
ecc = 0
∂5ccc
∂ecc
=
d(pcc − cm)− 2
√
ecc
2
√
ecc
= 0
and
∂5ccc
∂θcc
= c(pcc − cm)− 2λθ
c
c = 0
simultaneously. One simplification, one can obtain optimal
decision as pcc =
2(a+bδcc )λ+cm13
11
, ecc =
d2(A+bδcc )
2λ2
11
2 , and θ
c
c =
(A+bδcc )c
11
. Note that the Hessian matrix(H cc ) for the centralized
supply chain profit function can be found as:
H cc =

∂25ccc
∂pcc
2
∂25ccc
∂pcc∂ecc
∂25ccc
∂pcc∂θcc
∂25ccc
∂pcc∂ecc
∂25ccc
∂ecc
2
∂25ccc
∂ecc∂θcc
∂25ccc
∂pcc∂θcc
∂25ccc
∂ecc∂θcc
∂25ccc
∂θcc
2

=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−2b
d
2
√
ecc
c
d
2
√
ecc
−d(pcc − cm)
2ecc
3/2 0
c 0 −2λ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
The values of principal minors of H cc are H
c
c1 = −2b < 0;
H cc2 =
M1112
4 A2 d2λ2
> 0; and H cc3 = −
11
3
2(A+bδcc )2 d2λ2
< 0,
respectively. Consequently, the centralized profit function
will be concave if 11 > 0.
Substituting, optimal values in (5), SW cc is obtained as
SW cc =
(A+bδcc )λ(a(M3λ−c
2)+b((c2+d2λ)(cm+δcc )−2 b(3 cm+δ
c
c )λ))
11
2
Therefore, optimal value of δcc is obtained by solving
dSW cc
dδcc
=
2 b2λ(c2δcc+(2 a+d
2δcc−2 b(cm+δ
c
c ))λ)
11
2 = 0. On simplification one
can obtain δcc =
2 Aλ
13
. SW cc is concave if
d2 SW cc
dδcc
2 =
−
2 b2λ13
11
2 < 0, i.e. 13 > 0.
APPENDIX C
PROPERTIES OF OPTIMAL DECISION UNDER IN POLICY C
1) In centralized decision setting, differentiating decision
and auxiliary variables (in Proposition 2) with respect to
a) consumer sensitivity with GL(c), the followings are
obtained:
∂δcc
∂c
=
4 Acλ
13
2 > 0;
∂θcc
∂c
=
A(2 c2 +13)
13
2 > 0;
∂
√
ecc
∂c
=
2 Acdλ
13
2 > 0;
∂SW cc
∂c
=
2 A2 cλ
13
2 > 0;
∂5ccc
∂c
=
2 A2 c(4 bλ+13)λ
13
3 > 0.
b) consumer sensitivity with green-marketing effort(d),
the followings are obtained:
∂δcc
∂d
=
4 Adλ2
13
2 > 0;
∂θcc
∂d
=
2 Acdλ
13
2 > 0;
∂
√
ecc
∂d
=
A(2 d2λ+13)λ
13
2 > 0;
∂SW cc
∂d
=
2 A2 dλ2
13
2 > 0;
∂5ccc
∂d
=
2 A2 d(4 bλ+13)λ2
13
3 > 0.
c) to manufacturer investment efficiency (λ), the follow-
ings are obtained:
∂δcc
∂λ
= −
2 Ac2
13
2 < 0;
∂θcc
∂λ
= −
AcM1
13
2 < 0;
∂
√
ecc
∂λ
= −
Ac2 d
13
2 < 0;
∂SW cc
∂λ
= −
A2 c2
13
2 < 0;
∂5ccc
∂λ
= −
A2 c2(4 bλ+13)
13
2 < 0.
2) In decentralized decision setting, differentiating deci-
sion and auxiliary variables (in Proposition 1) with
respect to
a) consumer sensitivity with GL(c), the followings are
obtained:
∂δdc
∂c
=
2 AcM3λ
b132
> 0;
∂θdc
∂c
=
A(2 c2 +13)
13
2 > 0;
∂
√
edc
∂c
=
2 Acdλ
13
2 > 0;
∂SW dc
∂c
=
2 A2 cλ
13
2 > 0;
∂πdmc
∂c
=
2 A2 cλ(M3λ+12)
13
3 > 0;
∂πdrc
∂c
=
4 A2 cM2λ2
13
3 > 0.
b) consumer sensitivity with green-marketing effort(d),
the followings are obtained:
∂δdc
∂d
=
2 Adλ(c2 + 4 bλ)
b132
> 0;
∂θdc
∂d
=
2 Acdλ
13
2 >0;
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∂
√
edc
∂d
=
A(2 d2λ+13)λ
13
2 >0;
∂SW dc
∂d
=
2 A2 dλ2
13
2 >0;
∂πdmc
∂d
=
4 A2 dM3λ3
13
3 > 0;
∂πdrc
∂d
=
2 A2 d(M3λ+ c2)λ2
13
3 > 0.
c) manufacturer investment efficiency (λ), the follow-
ings are obtained:
∂δdc
∂λ
= −
Ac2 M3
b132
< 0;
∂θdc
∂λ
= −
AcM1
13
2 < 0;
∂
√
edc
∂λ
= −
Ac2 d
13
2 < 0;
∂SW dc
∂λ
=
A62 c2
13
2 < 0;
∂πdmc
∂c
=
A2 c2(M3λ+12)
13
3 < 0;
∂πdrc
∂c
=
2 A2 c2 M2λ
13
3 < 0.
Above inequalities ensure the claim.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREMS 1
By comparing optimal decisions for centralized and decen-
tralized SC settings in Policy C, the following inequalities are
obtained:
δcc − δ
d
c = −
AM2λ
b13
< 0; pcc − p
c
d = −
AM2λ
b13
< 0;
θcc − θ
d
c = 0;
√
ecc −
√
edc = 0;
5cc −5
d
c = −
2 A2 M2λ2
13
2 < 0;
Qcc − Q
d
c = 0; SW
c
c − SW
d
c = 0;
TScc − TS
d
c = −
2 A2 M2λ2
13
2 < 0.
Above inequalities ensures the proof.
APPENDIX E
PROPERTIES OF OPTIMAL DECISION IN POLICY M
1) In centralized decision setting, differentiating decision
and auxiliary variables (in Proposition 4) with respect to
a) consumer sensitivity with GL(c), the followings are
obtained:
∂ρcm
∂c
= 0;
∂θcm
∂c
=
AM3(M22λ+M3 c2)
15
2 > 0;
∂
√
ecm
∂c
=
2 AcdM2 M3λ
15
2 >0;
∂SW cm
∂c
=
2 A2 cM32λ
15
2 >0;
∂5ccm
∂c
=
2 A2 CM2 M3λ
15
2 > 0.
b) consumer sensitivity with green-marketing effort(d),
the followings are obtained:
∂ρcm
∂d
=
4 bd
M32
>0;
∂θcm
∂d
=
2 AcdM2(2 b+M3)λ
15
2 >0;
∂
√
ecm
∂d
=
AM2((4 b+ d2)M2λ− c2(6 b+M3))λ
15
2 >0;
∂SW cm
∂d
=
2 A2 dM2(2 b+M3)λ2
15
2 > 0;
∂5ccm
∂d
=
2 A2 d(M22λ+ 2 bc2)λ
15
2 > 0.
c) manufacturer investment efficiency (λ), the follow-
ings are obtained:
∂ρcm
∂λ
= 0;
∂θcm
∂λ
= −
AcM22 M3
15
2 < 0;
∂
√
ecm
∂λ
=−
Ac2 dM2 M3
15
2 <0;
∂SW cm
∂λ
=−
A2 c2M32
15
2 <0;
∂5ccm
∂λ
= −
A2 c2 M2 M3
15
2 < 0.
2) In decentralized decision setting, differentiating deci-
sion and auxiliary variables (in Proposition 3) with
respect to
a) consumer sensitivity with GL(c), the followings are
obtained:
∂ρdm
∂c
= 0;
∂θdm
∂c
=
AM4(4M22λ+ c2 M4)
14
2 > 0;
∂
√
edm
∂c
=
4 AcdM2 M4λ
14
2 > 0;
∂SW dm
∂c
=
2 A2 cM42)2λ
14
2 > 0;
∂πdmm
∂c
=
4 A2 cM2 M4λ
14
2 > 0;
∂πdrm
∂c
=
16 A2 cM23 M4λ2
14
3 > 0.
b) consumer sensitivity with green-marketing effort (d),
the followings are obtained:
∂ρdm
∂d
=
8 bd
M42
>0;
∂θdm
∂d
=
8 AcdM2(2 b+M4)λ
14
2 >0;
∂
√
edm
∂d
=
2 A(4M22(4 b+d2)λ−c2(M2 M4−4 bd2))λ
14
2
> 0;
∂SW dm
∂d
=
8 A2 M2(2 b+M4)λ2
14
2 > 0;
∂πdmm
∂d
=
8 A2 d(2M22λ+ bc2)λ
14
2 > 0;
∂πdrm
∂d
=
8 A2 dM22(4M22λ+ 3 c2 M3)λ2
14
3 > 0.
c) to manufacturer investment efficiency (λ), the follow-
ings are obtained:
∂ρdm
∂λ
= 0;
∂θdm
∂λ
= −
4 AcM22 M4
14
2 < 0;
∂
√
edm
∂λ
= −
2 Ac2 dM2 M4
14
2 < 0;
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∂SW dm
∂λ
= −
A2 c2M42
14
2 < 0;
∂πdmm
∂λ
= −
2 A2 c2 M2 M4
14
2 < 0;
∂πdrm
∂λ
= −
8 A2 c2M23 M4λ
14
2 < 0.
Above inequalities ensure the claim.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF THEOREMS 2
By comparing optimal decision between centralized and
decentralized decisions in Policy M, the following inequal-
ities are obtained, ρcm − ρ
d
m,
√
ecm −
√
edm, Q
c
m − Q
d
m, and
TScm − TS
d
m, as shown at the bottom of the next page.
Above inequalities ensures the proof.
APPENDIX G
PROFIT DIFFERENCE IN PRESENCE AND ABSENCE OF
SUBSIDY
Difference between profits of SC member in the pres-
ence of subsidy (Propositions 1-4) and absence of sub-
sidy(Propositions 5-6) are obtained as follows:
πdmc − π
d
mb =
A2 M3λ2(12 +13)
1213
2 > 0,
πdrc − π
d
rb =
A2 M2 M3λ3(12 +13)
12
213
2 > 0,
πdmm − π
d
mb =
A2 c2 M3λ
1214
> 0,
πdrm − π
d
rb =
A2 c2 M2 M3λ2(c2 M3 + 214)
12
214
2 > 0,
5ccc −5
c
cb =
4 A2 bλ2(2 bλ+13)
1113
2 > 0,
5ccm −5
c
cb =
2 A2 bc2λ
1115
> 0.
Above inequalities ensure the claim.
APPENDIX H
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
By comparing centralized optimal decisions between Policy
C and M, the following relations are obtained:
pcc − p
c
m =
4 Abλ11
1315
> 0; θcc − θ
c
m =
4 Ab2 cλ
1315
> 0;√
ecc −
√
ecm =
2 Abdλ11
1315
> 0;
5cc −5
c
m =
2 A2 bλ(M2λ13 +112)
13
215
> 0;
Qcc − Q
c
m =
4 Ab2λ11
1313
> 0;
SW cc − SW
c
m =
4 A2 b2λ2
1315
> 0;
TScc−TS
c
m=
2 A2 bλ
13
215
2 [2 M
3
2λ
211−3 c2 M2λ14+c4 M311
− 2bc2(12 b2 + 8 bM2 − d2 M4)] > 0.
Similarly, by comparing decentralized optimal decisions
between Policy C andM, the following relations are obtained,
pdc − p
d
m,π
d
rc − π
d
rm, 5
d
c −5
d
m, λ))] > 0;
Qdc − Q
d
m, and TS
c
d − TS
d
m, as show at the bottom of the next
page.
The above inequalities ensure the proof.
APPENDIX I
OPTIMAL DECISION UNDER RS CONTRACT IN POLICY C
The optimal solution of the retailer’s optimization problem
defined in Equation (14) is obtained by solving ∂π
rs
rc
∂prsc
=
0 and ∂π
rs
rc
∂ersc
= 0, simultaneously. After simplification,
one can obtain the price and green-marketing effort as
prsc =
4 a+4 bδrsc +4 cθ
rs
c −d
2 wrsc
2(M2+d2φrsc )
+
wrsc
2(1−φrsc )
and ersc =
d2((a+bδrsc +cθ
rs
c )(1−φ
rs
c )−bw
rs
c )
2
(M2+d2φrsc )2
. Profit function for the retailer is
concave because ∂
2π rsrc
∂prsc
2 = −2 b(1 − φ
rs
c ) < 0 and
∂2π rsrc
∂prsc
2 ×
∂2π rsrc
∂ersc
2 −
(
∂2π rsrc
∂prsc ∂ersc
)2
=
(M2+d2φrsc )
3(1−φrsc )
4 d2((a+bδrsc +cθ rsc )(1−φrsc )−bwrsc )2
> 0.
Using retailer’s response, profit function for the manu-
facturer is obtained as π rsmc =
1
(M2+d2φrsc )2(1−φrsc )2
[2 b((a +
bδrsc + cθ
rs
c )(1 − φ
rs
c ) − bw
rs
c )((2a + 2bδ
rs
c + 2 cθ
rs
c −
cmd2)φrsc
2
− (2a + 2bδrsc + 2 cθ
rs
c −M1(w
rs
c − 2 cm))φ
rs
c ) −
M2(wrsc − cm)] − λθ
rs
c
2. Therefore, by solving ∂π
rs
mc
∂wrsc
= 0 and
∂π rsmc
∂θ rsc
= 0, the optimal wholesale price and GL are obtained as
wrsc =
(aM2+bcm11+bM2)(1−φrsc )
b(12−2 M1φrsc )
and θ rsc =
(A+bδrsc )c
212−2 M1φrsc
Profit
function for the manufacturer is concave because ∂
2π rsmc
∂wrsc
2 =
−
4 b2(M2−M1φrsc )
(M2+d2φrsc )2(1−φrsc )2
< 0 and ∂
2π rsmc
∂wrsc
2 ×
∂2π rsmc
∂θ rsc
2 −
(
∂2π rsmc
∂wrsc ∂θ rsc
)2
=
4 b2(12−2 M1φrsc )
(M2+d2φrsc )2(1−φrsc )2
> 0.
Finally, optimal value of subsidy rate is obtained by solv-
ing dSW
rs
c
dδrsc
= 0. On simplification one can obtain δrsc =
A(M3−2 M1φrsc −d
2φrsc
2)λ
b1rsc
. SW function under coordination is
concave because d
2 SW rsc
dδrsc
2 = −
2 b2λ1rsc
(12−2 M1φrsc )2
< 0.
APPENDIX J
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Differentiating profit functions for the supply chain members
with respect to contract parameters, the following relations
are obtained, ∂π
rs
mc
∂φrsc
, ∂π
rs
rc
∂φrsc
, ∂Q
rs
c
∂φrsc
, ∂π
es
mc
∂ψesc
, ∂π
es
rc
∂ψesc
, and ∂Q
es
c
∂ψesc
, as shown
at the bottom of the next page.
The above inequalities ensure the proof.
APPENDIX K
PROOF OF THEOREM 5
1) In RS contract
a) The difference between profits for the retailer
in Table 3 and decentralized scenario (Proposition 3)
is obtained as
π rsmm − π
d
mm
=
2A2λφrsm (M1(4M2
2λ−c2 M1)−M2(4M12λ+c2d2)φrsm )
141rsm
>0.
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Therefore, π rsmm ≥ π
d
mm holds if φ
rs
m ≤
M1(4M22λ−c2 M1)
M2(4M12λ+c2 d2)
b) The difference between profits for the manu-
facturer in Table 3 and decentralized scenario
(Proposition 3) is obtained as π rsrm − π
d
rm =
4 A2λ2((M2−d2φrsm )(M2−M1φ
rs
m )14
2
−M321
rs
m
2)
14
21rsm
2 > 0. There-
fore, π rsrm ≥ π
d
rm holds if φ
rs
m ≤ φ
rs
m
∗, where φrsm
∗ is the
positive root of the cubic equation α0φrsm
3
−α1φ
rs
m
2
+
α2φ
rs
m − α3 = 0 where, α0 = 16 b
2 M21 M
3
2λ
2
−
4 c2 d2M21M2
2(b+M2)λ+c4 d2(2 b2(2 b2+d2M2)+
M32 (M1−d
2));α1 = M1(32 b2M42λ
2
+4 c2M22(8 b3+
M2(bM2 − b2 d2 − d2 M4))λ − c4(8 b3(b + M2) +
(11 bM1− bd2+ 7 d2 M2)M22); α2 = 16 b2 M52λ
2
+
4 c2(b+M1)M32 (8 bM1−3 d
2 M2)λ− c4 M2(20 b4+
9 b2 d2 M2 + (10 b2 + 17 bM1 − 8 d2 M2)M22);
α3 = 4 c2M22(b2 + 4 bM1 − d2 M2)14.
2) In ES contract
a) The difference between profits for the retailer
in Table 3 and decentralized scenario (Proposition 3)
is obtained as πesmm−π
d
mm =
A2λ
14
21esm
2 [(8 b(1−ψ
es
m )
2
−
d2(2− 3ψesm ))(1−φ
rs
m )
214
2
− 2M21esm
2]. Therefore,
πesmm ≥ π
d
mm holds if φ
es
m ≤ φ
es
m
∗∗, where φesm
∗ is
the positive root of the cubic equation 4 b(8 M2λ +
c2)ηesm
3
− (c2(6 b + d2) + 4 M2(6 b + M4)λ)ηesm
2
+
(256 b2λ− 2 d2(28 bλ+ 2M4λ+11))ηesm −14 = 0.
b) The The difference between profits for the man-
ufacturer in Table 3 and decentralized scenario
(Proposition 3) is obtained as πesrm − π
d
rm =
1
14
21esm
2 [A
2λ2((M2− 4 bψesm )(8 b(1−ψ
es
m )
2
− d2(2−
3ψesm ))(1 − φ
rs
m )
314
2
− 4 M321
es
m
2)] > 0. Therefore,
πesrm ≥ π
d
rm holds ifψ
es
m ≤ ψ
es∗∗∗
m , whereψ
es∗∗∗
m is the
real root of the equation, a0ψesm
7
−a1ψesm
6
+a2ψesm
5
−
ρcm − ρ
d
m=−
M2 M1
M3 M4
< 0; pcm − p
d
m=−
2 AλM2(M2213 − bc2(2 b+M2))
b1514
< 0; θcm − θ
d
m =
AcM22(4 b+M3)λ
1415
>0;
√
ecm −
√
edm =
AdM2λ(2M22λ− c2 M1)
1415
> 0; 5ccm −5
d
cm =
A2 M2λ((2M22λ− c2 M1)2 − 2 c2 M115)
14
215
> 0;
Qcm − Q
d
m =
2 AbM2λ(2M22λ− c2 M1)
1415
> 0; SW cm − SW
d
m =
A2(4 b+M3)M22λ2
1415
> 0;
TScm − TS
d
m =
A2 c2 M2 M3λ[(4 b+ d2)Mλ14 +M1(M23λ2 − c4M4)− c2 d2 M2 M4λ]
14
215
> 0.
pdc − p
d
m =
AM23λ12
b1413
> 0; θdc − θ
d
m =
AcM23λ
1314
> 0;
√
edc −
√
edm =
AdλM312
1314
> 0;
πdrc − π
d
rm =
A2 M2 M312λ2(M2(511−d2λ)−2 bc2)
13
214
2 >0; π
d
mc − π
d
mm =
A2 M3λ(M2λ(411 − d2λ)+112)
13
214
> 0;
5dc −5
d
m =
1
13
214
2 [A
2 M3λ(3 M2(M1 + 2 M2)λ214 + c4(14 bM2λ+14)− c2 M2λ(23 M211 + 4(b2 + 2M22)λ))] > 0;
Qdc − Q
d
m =
2 AM3λ12
1314
> 0; SW dc − SW
d
m =
A2 M23λ
2
1314
> 0;
TScd − TS
d
m =
A2 M3λ(8M22λ214 − c2 M4(M21λ
2
+ 8 M2λ11 + c4))
13
214
2 > 0.
∂π rsmc
∂φrsc
=
−2 A2λ2(2 d2λ(2 b+ (M2 + d2φrsc )(1− φ
rs
c ))φ
rs
c + (M1 + 2 d
2φrsc )1
rs
c )
1rsc
3 < 0
∂π rsrc
∂φrsc
=
−2 A2λ2(2 d2λ(M2 + d2φrsc )φ
rs
c (1− φ
rs
c )+ (M1 + d
2φrsc )1
rs
c )
1rsc
3 < 0
∂Qrsc
∂φrsc
=
−4 Abd2λ2φrsc
1rsc
2 < 0
∂πesmc
∂ψesc
=
−A2 d2λ22(1− ψesc )(4λ(M3 − 6 bψ
es
c ))(1− ψ
es
c )ψ
es
c + (1+ ψ
es
c )1
es
c )
1erc
3 < 0
∂πesrc
∂ψesc
=
−A2 d2λ2(1− ψesc )
2(4λ(M2 − 4 bψesc ))ψ
es
c +1
es
c )
1esc
3 < 0
∂Qesc
∂ψesc
=
−4 Abd2λ2ψesc (1− ψ
es
c )
1esc
2 < 0
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a3ψesm
4
+ a4ψesm
3
− a5ψesm
2
+ a6ψesm − a7 = 0, where
a0 = 16 b2(256 bM32λ
2
+64 bc2M22λ−c4(1008 b2−
444 bd2 + 49 d4)); a1 = 64 b(64 bM32 M3λ
2
+
4 bc2M22(6 b+ 5M3)λ− c4(1680 b3 − 888 b2 d2 +
146 bd4−7 d6)); a2 = 192 bM32 (320 b
2
−100 bd2+
7 d4)λ2+16 bc2M22(2112 b2−560 bd2+33 d4)λ−
4 c4(76608 b4 − 46636 b3 d2 + 9676 b2 d4 −
759 bd6 + 16 d8); a3 = 16 M32 (5120 b
3
−
2240 b2 d2+284 bd4−9 d6)λ2+8 c2M22(8320 b3−
3136 b2 d2 + 338 bd4 − 9 d6)λ − c4(483840 b4 −
329408 b3 d2 + 79964 b2 d4 − 8028 bd6 + 271 d8);
a4 = 4 M32 (15360 b
3
− 8320 b2 d2 + 1424 bd4 −
75 d6)λ2 + 16 c2M22(4800 b3 − 2272 b2 d2 +
335 bd4−15 d6)λ− c4(456960 b4−340192 b3 d2+
92452 b2 d4 − 10796 bd6 + 453 d8); a5 =
16 M42 (384 b
2
− 144 bd2 + 13 d4)λ2 + 8 c2(4 b +
M2)M22(816 b2−350 bd2+37 d4)λ−c4(258048 b4−
206272 b3 d2 + 60916 b2 d4 − 7860 bd6 + 373 d8);
a6 = 16M52 (2 b+M6)λ
2
+32 c2M32 (152 b
2
−56 bd2+
5 d4)λ−c4 M2(20160 b3−11996 b2 d2+2348 bd4−
151 d6); and a7 = 8 c2 d2M22 M314.
APPENDIX L
PROOF OF THEOREM 6
1) In RS contract,
a) The difference between profits for the retailer in
Proposition 7 and decentralized scenario in Proposi-
tion 5, satisfies π rsmb − π
d
mb =
2 A2 M1λ2φrsb
121
rs
b
> 0 if
φrsb > 0
b) The difference between profits for the manu-
facturer in Proposition 7 and decentralized sce-
nario in Proposition 5, satisfies π rsrb − π
d
rb =
A2λ2φrsb (2 c
2 M112−(16 b2λ11+c2(4M12λ+c2 d2))φrsb )
12
21rsb
2 > 0 if
φrsb ≤
2 c2 M112
16 b2λ11+c2(4M12λ+c2 d2)
.
2) In ES contract
a) The difference between profits for the retailer in
Proposition 8 and decentralized scenario in Proposi-
tion 5, satisfies πesmb − π
d
mb =
A2 d2λ2ψesb (1−2ψ
es
b )
121
es
b
> 0
if ψesb ≤ 1/2.
b) The difference between profits for the manu-
facturer in Proposition 8 and decentralized sce-
nario in Proposition 5, satisfies πesrb − π
d
rb =
1
12
21esb
2 [A
2 d2λ2ψesb (Mλψ
es
b (21
es
b −d
2λ(1−2ψesb ))+
c2(1 − ψesb )
312)] if ψesb ≤ ψ
es∗
b , where ψ
es∗
b is the
real root of the equation, (16 bM2λ2 − c4)ψesb
3
−
4(M2(2 b+M3)λ2+2 c2M2λ−3 c4)ψesb
2
+(M2(2 b+
M4)λ2 − 4 c2 M2λ+ 3 c4)ψesb − c
212.
APPENDIX M
RSES CONTRACT
In RSES contract, the retailer shares a percentage revenue
with the manufacturer and the manufacturer also shares a
percentage of green marketing-expenditure with the retailer.
The profit functions for the manufacturer and retailer are as
follows:
π reesmb = (w
rees
b − cm + φ
rees
b p
rees
b )D
rees
b − ψ
rees
b e
rees
b
π reesrb = ((1− φ
rees
b )p
rees
b − w
rees
b )D
rees
b
− (1− ψ reesb )e
rees
b − λθ
rees
b
2
The outcome in RSES contract is presented in Corollary 1.
Corollary 1:RSES contract coordinates the GSC if φrsesb =
ψ rsesb and φb ∈
(
M2λ
11
,
M2λ(3λM2−2 c2)
11
2
)
. In that scenario,
wholesale price for the manufacturer is wreesb = cm(1−φ
rses
b )
and profits for the manufacturer and retailer are π reesmb =
A2λ(M2λφrsesb −c
2)
11
2 and π
rees
rb =
A2 M2λ2(1−φrsesb )
11
2 , respectively.
Proof: The optimal solution of the retailer’s optimiza-
tion problem is obtained by solving the following first order
conditions
∂π reesrb
∂preesb
= 0 and
∂π rsesrb
∂ersesb
0, simultaneously. After sim-
plification, one can obtain retail price and green-marketing
effort as prsesb =
1
(1−φrsesb )(4 b(1−ψ
rses
b )−d
2(1−φrsesb ))
[(2 a(1 −
φrsesb ) + 2 bw
rses
b )(1 − ψ
rses
b ) − (1 − φ
rses
b )(d
2 wrsesb −
2 c(1 − ψ rsesb )θ
rses
b )] and e
rses
b =
d2((a+cθ rsesb )(1−φ
rses
b )−bw
rses
b )
2
(4 b(1−ψrsesb )−d
2(1−φrsesb ))
2 ,
respectively. Based on the retailer’s response, the manu-
facturer can coordinate the retailer’s decision in pricing
and green-marketing effort by setting prsesb = p
c
c and√
ersesb =
√
ecc. Therefore, the wholesale prices are obtained
aswrsesb |(prsesb =pcc) =
(1−φrsesb )
11(M1−2 bψrsesb −d
2φrsesb )
[2 a(c2(1−ψ rsesb )+
d2λ(φrsesb − ψ
rses
b )) + 2 b(((4 b + d
2)λ + 2 c2)cm(1 −
ψ rsesb ) + λ(4 cθ (1 − ψ
rses
b ) + cmd
2(2 − φrsesb − ψ
rses
b ))) +
(c2 + d2λ)(cmd2(1 − φrsesb ) + 2 cθ
rses
b (1 − ψ
rses
b ))] and
wrsesb |
√
ersesb =
√
ecc
=
1
b11
[a(4 bλ(ψ rsesb − φ
rses
b ) − c
2(1 −
φrsesb ))+bcmλ(M2−4 bψ
rses
b −d
2φrsesb )+c(M2λ−c
2)θ rsesb (1−
φrsesb )]. Because, the wholesale prices must be unique so by
equating wrsesb |(prsesb =pcc) = w
rses
b |
√
ersesb =
√
ecc
, one can obtain
θ rsesb =
A(2 bλ(φrsesb −ψ
rses
b )+c
2(1−φrsesb ))
c(1−φrsesb )11
. Now, supply chain coor-
dination can be achieved if θ rsesb = θ
c
c . On simplification,
one can obtain φrsesb = ψ
rses
b . By using back-substitution, one
can obtain the optimal decision as presented in Corollary 1.
Note that, themanufacturer needs to set lower wholesale price
compared to marginal cost [17], which is well documented in
existing literature. The total supply chain profits is also equal
to centralized supply chain profit.
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